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ABSTRACT
Software product line (SPL) engineers put a lot of effort to ensure
that, through the setting of a large number of possible configuration
options, products are acceptable and well-tailored to customers’
needs. Unfortunately, options and their mutual interactions create
a huge configuration space which is intractable to exhaustively
explore. Instead of testing all products, machine learning techniques
are increasingly employed to approximate the set of acceptable
products out of a small training sample of configurations. Machine
learning (ML) techniques can refine a software product line through
learned constraints and a priori prevent non-acceptable products
to be derived. In this paper, we use adversarial ML techniques
to generate adversarial configurations fooling ML classifiers and
pinpoint incorrect classifications of products (videos) derived from
an industrial video generator. Our attacks yield (up to) a 100%
misclassification rate and a drop in accuracy of 5%. We discuss the
implications these results have on SPL quality assurance.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Testers don’t like to break things; they like to dispel
the illusion that things work. [34]
Software Product Line Engineering (SPLE) aims at delivering
massively customized products within shortened development cy-
cles [19, 46]. To achieve this goal, SPLE systematically reuses soft-
ware assets realizing the functionality of one or more features,
which we loosely define as units of variability. Users can specify
products matching their needs by selecting/deselecting the features
and provide additional values for their attributes. Based on such
configurations, the corresponding products can be obtained as a
result of the product derivation phase. A long-standing issue for
developers and product managers is to gain confidence that all
possible products are functionally viable, e.g., all products compile
and run. This is a hard problem, since modern software product
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lines (SPLs) can involve thousands of features and practitioners
cannot test all possible configurations and corresponding products
due to combinatorial explosion. Research efforts rely on variability
models (e.g., feature diagrams) and solvers (SAT, CSP, SMT) to com-
pactly define how features can and cannot be combined [2, 4, 5, 48].
Together with advances in model-checking, software testing and
program analysis techniques, it is conceivable to assess the func-
tional validity of configurations and their associated combination
of assets within a product of the SPL [12, 13, 18, 40, 53, 56].
Yet, when dealing with qualities on the derived products (perfor-
mance, costs, etc.) several unanswered challenges remain from the
specification of feature-aware quantities to the best trade-offs be-
tween products and family-based analyses (e.g., [37, 58]). In our
industrial case-study, the MOTIV video generator [27], one can
approximately generate 10314 video variants. Furthermore, it takes
about 30 minutes to create a new video: a non-acceptable (e.g., a
too noisy or dark) video can lead to a tremendous waste of re-
sources. A promising approach is to sample a number of config-
urations and predict the quantitative or qualitative properties of
the remaining configurations using Machine Learning (ML) tech-
niques [30, 43, 47, 50, 51, 55, 57]. These techniques create a pre-
dictive model (a classifier) from such sampled configurations and
infer the properties of yet unseen configurations with respect to
their distribution’s similarity. This way, unseen configurations that
do not match specific properties can be automatically discarded
and constraints can be added to the feature diagram in order to
avoid them permanently [54, 55]. However, we need to trust the
ML classifier [1, 42] to avoid costly misclassifications. In the ML
community, it has been demonstrated that some forged instances,
called adversarial, can fool a given classifier [11]. Adversarial ma-
chine learning (advML) thus refers to techniques designed to fool
(e.g., [6, 7, 42]), evaluate the security (e.g., [9]) and even improve
the quality of learned classifiers [28]. Our overall goal is to study
how advML techniques can be used to assess quality assurance of
ML classifiers employed in SPL activities. In this paper, we design a
generator of adversarial configurations for SPLs and measure how
the prediction ability of the classifier is affected by such adversarial
configurations. We also provide scenarios of usage of advML for
quality assurance of SPLs. We discuss how adversarial configura-
tions raise questions about the quality of the variability model or
the testing oracle of SPL’s products. This paper makes the following
contributions:
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(1) An adversarial attack generator, based on evasions attacks
and dedicated to SPLs;
(2) An assessment of its effectiveness and a comparison against
a random strategy, showing that up to 100% of the attacks are
valid with respect to the variability model and successful in
fooling the prediction of acceptable/non-acceptable videos,
leading to a 5% loss in accuracy;
(3) A qualitative discussion on the generated adversarial con-
figurations w.r.t. to the classifier training set, its potential
improvement and the practical impact of advML in the qual-
ity assurance workflow of SPLs.
(4) The public availability of our implementation and empirical
results at https://github.com/templep/SPLC_2019
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
case study and gives background information about ML and advML;
Section 3 shows how advML is used in the context of MOTIV;
Section 4 describes experimental procedures and discusses results;
Section 5 and 6 presents some potential threats that could mitigate
our conclusions and propose qualitative discussions about how
adversarial configurations could be leveraged for SPLs developers.
Section 7 covers related work and Section 8 wraps up the paper
with conclusions.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Motivating case: MOTIV generator
MOTIV is an industrial video generator which purpose is to provide
synthetic videos that can be used to benchmark computer vision
based systems. Video sequences are generated out of configurations
specifying the content of the scenes to render [55]. MOTIV relies
on a variability model that documents possible values of more than
100 configuration options, each of them affecting the perception of
generated videos and the achievement of subsequent tasks, such
as recognizing moving objects. Perception’s variability relates to
changes in the background (e.g., being a forest or buildings), objects
passing in front of the camera (with varying distances to the camera
and different trajectories), blur, etc. There are 20 Boolean options,
46 categorical (encoded as enumerations) options (e.g., to define
predefined trajectories) and 42 real-value options (e.g., dealing with
blur or noise). Precisely, enumerations contain about 7 elements
each and, in average, real-value options vary between 0 and 27.64
with a precision of 10−5. Excluding (very few) constraints in the
variability model, we over-estimate the video variants’ space size:
220 ∗ 746 ∗ ((0− 27.64) ∗ 105)42 ≈ 10314. Concretely, MOTIV takes as
input a text file describing the scene to be captured by a synthetic
camera as well as recording conditions. Then, Lua [33] scripts are
called to compose the scene and apply desired visual effects result-
ing in a video sequence. To realize variability, the Lua code use
parameters in functions to activate or deactivate options and to
take into account values (enumerations or real values) defined into
the configuration file. A highly challenging problem is to identify
feature values and interactions that make the identification of mov-
ing objects extremely difficult if not impossible. Typically, some
of the generated videos contain too much noise or blur. In other
words, they are not acceptable as they cannot be used to bench-
mark object tracking techniques. Another class of non-acceptable
videos is composed of the ones in which pixels value do not change,
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Figure 1: Refining the variabilitymodel ofMOTIV video gen-
erator via an ML classifier.
resulting in a succession of images for which all pixels have the
same color: nothing can be perceived. As mentioned in Section 1,
non-acceptable videos represent a waste of time and resources:
30 minutes per video, not including to run benchmarks related to
object tracking (several minutes depending on the computer vision
algorithm). We therefore need to constraint our variability model
to avoid such cases.
2.2 Previous work: ML and MOTIV
We previously used ML classification techniques to predict the
acceptability of unseen video variants [55]. We summarise this
process in Figure 1.
We first sample valid configurations using a random strategy
(see Temple et al. [55] for details) and generate the associated video
sequences. A computer program playing the role of a testing oracle
then labels videos as acceptable (in green) or non-acceptable (in
red). This oracle implements image quality assessment [24] defined
by the authors via an analysis of frequency distribution given by
Fourier transformations. An ML classifier (in our case, a decision
tree) can be trained on such labelled videos. “Paths" (traversals from
the top to the leaves) leading to non-acceptable videos can easily
be transformed into new constraints and injected in the variability
model. An ML classifier can make errors, preventing acceptable
videos (false negatives) or allowing non-acceptable videos (false
positives). Most of these errors can be attributed to the confidence
of the classifier coming from both its design (i.e., the set of ap-
proximations used to build its decision model) and the training
set (and more specifically the distribution of the classes). Areas of
low confidence exist if configurations are very dissimilar to those
already seen or at the frontier between two classes. We use advML
to quantify these errors and their impact on MOTIV.
2.3 ML and advML
ML classification. Formally, a classification algorithm builds a func-
tion f : X 7→ Y that associates a label in the set of predefined classes
y ∈ Y with configurations represented in a feature space (noted
x ∈ X ). In MOTIV, only two classes are defined: Y = {−1,+1},
respectively representing acceptable and non-acceptable videos. X
represents a set of configurations and the configuration space is
defined by configuration options of the underlying feature model
(and their definition domain). The classifier f is trained on a data
set D constituted of a set of pairs (xti , y
t
i ) where xi ∈ X are a set
2
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Figure 2: Adversarial configurations (stars) are at the limit
of the separating function learned by the ML classifier
of valid configurations from the variability model and yi ∈ Y their
associated labels. To label configurations in D, we use an oracle (see
Figure 1). Once the classifier is trained, f induces a separation in
the feature space (shown as the transition from the blue/left to the
white/right area in Figure 2) that mimics the oracle: when an unseen
configuration occurs, the classifier determines instantly in which
class this configuration belongs to. Unfortunately, the separation
can make prediction errors since the classifier is based on statistical
assumptions and a (small) training sample. We can see in Figure 2
that the separation diverges from the solid black line representing
the target oracle. As a result, two squares are misclassified as being
triangles. Classification algorithms realise trade-offs between the
necessity to classify the labelled data correctly, taking into account
the fact that it can be noisy or biased and its ability to generalise
to unseen data. Such trade-offs lead to approximations that can be
leveraged by adversarial configurations (shown as stars in Figure 2).
AdvML and evasion attacks. According to Biggio et al. [11], delib-
erately attacking an ML classifier with crafted malicious inputs was
proposed in 2004. Today, it is called adversarial machine learning
and can be seen as a sub-discipline of machine learning. Depend-
ing on the attackers’ access to various aspects of the ML system
(dataset, ability to update the training set) and their goals, various
kinds of attacks [6–10] are available: they are organised in a taxon-
omy [1, 11]. In this paper, we focus on evasion attacks: these attacks
move labelled data to the other side of the separation (putting it in
the opposite class) via successive modifications of features’ values.
Since areas close to the separation are of low confidence, such ad-
versarial configurations can have a significant impact if added to the
training set. To determine the direction to move the data towards
the separation, a gradient-based method has been proposed by Big-
gio et al. [6]. This method requires the attacked ML algorithm to be
differentiable. One of such differentiable classifiers is the Support
Vector Machine (SVM), parameterizable with a kernel function1.
3 EVASION ATTACKS FOR MOTIV
3.1 A dedicated Evasion Algorithm
Algorithm 1 presents our adaptation of Biggio et al.’s evasion
attack [6]. First, we select an initial configuration to be moved
(x0): selection tradeoffs are discussed in the next section. Then,
1most common functions are linear, radial based functions and polynomial
Algorithm 1 Our algorithm conducting the gradient-descent eva-
sion attack inspired by [6]
Input: x0, the initial configuration; t, the step size; nb_disp, the
number of displacements; g, the discriminant function
Output: x∗, the final attack point
(1) m = 0;
(2) Set x0 to a copy of a configuration of the class from which
the attack starts;
whilem < nb_disp do
(3) m = m+1;
(4) Let ∇F (xm−1) a unit vector, normalisation of ∇д(xm−1);
(5) xm = xm−1 − t∇F (xm−1);
end while
(6) return x∗ = xm ;
we need to set the step size (t ), a parameter controlling the con-
vergence of the algorithm. Large steps induce difficulties to con-
verge, while small steps may trap the algorithm in a local optimum.
While the original algorithm introduced a termination criterion
based on the impact of the attack on the classifier between each
move (if this impact was smaller than a threshold ϵ , the algorithm
stopped; assuming an optimal attack) we fixed the maximal number
of displacements nb_disp in advance. This allows for a controllable
computation budget, as we observed that for small step sizes the
number of displacements required to meet the termination crite-
rion was too large. The function д is the discriminant function
and is defined by the ML algorithm that is used. It is defined as
д : X 7→ R that maps a configuration to a real number. In fact, only
the sign of д is used to assign a label to a configuration x . Thus,
f : X 7→ Y can be decomposed in two successive functions: first
д : X 7→ R that maps a configuration to a real value and then
h : R 7→ Y with h = siдn(д). However, |д(x)| (the absolute value
of д) intuitively reflects the confidence the classifier has in its as-
signment of x . |д(x)| increases when x is far from the separation
and surrounded by other configurations from the same class and is
smaller when x is close to the separation. Using this discriminant
function has been proposed by Biggio et al. [6] and should not be
confused with the unrelated discriminator component of GANs by
Goodfellow et al. [28]. In GANs, the discriminator is part of the
“robustification process". It is an ML classifier striving to determine
whether an input has been artificially produced by the other GANs’
component, called the generator. Its responses are then exploited
by the generator to produce increasingly realistic inputs. In this
work, we only generate adversarial configurations, though GANs
are envisioned as follow-up work.
Concretely, the core of the algorithm consists of thewhile loop
that iterates over the number of displacements. Statement (4) de-
termines the direction towards the area of maximum impact with
respect to the classifier (explainingwhy only a unit vector is needed).
∇д(xm−1) is the gradient of д(xm−1) and the direction of interest
towards which the adversarial configuration should move. This
vector is then multiplied by the step size t and subtracted to the
previous move (5). The final position is returned after the number
of displacements has been reached. For statements (4) and (5) we
simplified the initial algorithm [6]: we do not try to mimic as much
3
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as possible existing configurations as we look forward to some
diversity. In an open ended feature space, gradient can grow indef-
initely possibly preventing the algorithm to terminate. Biggio et
al. [6] set a maximal distance representing a boundary of the feasi-
ble region to keep the exploration under control. In MOTIV, this
boundary is represented by the hard constraints in the variability
model. Because of the heterogeneity of MOTIV features, cross-tree
constraints and domain values are difficult to specify and enforce in
the attack algorithm. SAT/SMT solvers would slow down the attack
process. We only take care of the type of feature values (natural
integers, floats, Boolean). For example, we reset to zero natural
integer values that could be negative due to displacements or we
ensure that Boolean values are either 0 or 1.
As introduced in Section 2, decision trees are not directly com-
patible with evasion attacks as the underlying mathematical model
is highly non-linear making it non-derivable (forbidding to com-
pute a gradient). We learn another classifier (i.e., a Support Vector
Machine) on which we can perform evasion attacks directly [6, 11].
We rely upon evidence that attacks conducted on a specific ML
model can be transferred to others [14, 15, 21, 22].
3.2 Implementation
We implemented the above procedure in Python 3 (scripts available
on the companion website). Figure 3 depicts some images of videos
generated out of adversarial configurations.
MOTIV’s variability model embeds enumerations which are usu-
ally encoded via integers. The main difference between the two is
the logical order that is inherent to integers but not encoded into
enumerations. As a result, some ML techniques have difficulties to
deal with them. The solution is to “dummify" enumerations into
a set of Boolean features, which truth values take into account
exclusion constraints in the original enumerations. Conveniently,
Python provides the get_dummies function from the pandas library
which takes as input a set of configurations and feature indexes
to dummify. For each feature index, the function creates and re-
turns a set of Boolean features representing the literals indexes
encountered while running through given configurations: if the
get_dummies function detects values in the integer range [0, 9] for
a feature associated to an enumeration, it will return a set of 10
Boolean features representing literals indexes in that range. It also
takes care or preserving the semantics of enumerations. However,
dummification is not without consequences for the ML classifier.
First, it increases the number of dimensions: our 46 initial enu-
merations would be transformed into 145 features. Doing so may
expose the ML algorithm to the curse of dimensionality [3]: as the
number of features increases in the feature space, configurations
that look alike (i.e., with close feature values and the same label)
tend to go away from each other, making the learning process more
complex. This curse has also been recognised to have an impact on
SPL activities [20]. Dummification implies that we will operate our
attacks in a feature space that is the essentially different than the
one induced by the real SPL. This means that we need to transpose
the generated attacks in the dummified feature space back to the
original SPL one, raising one main issue: there is no guarantee that
an attack relevant in the dummified space is still efficient in the
reduced original space (the separation may simply not be the same).
Additionally, gradient methods operate per feature only, meaning
that exclusion constraints in dummified enumerations are ignored.
That is, when transposed back to the original configuration space,
invalid configurations would need to be “fixed", potentially putting
these adversarial configurations away from the optimum computed
by the gradient method. For all these reasons, we decided to operate
on the initial feature space, acknowledging the threat of considering
enumerations as ordered. We conducted a preliminary analysis2
that showed that the order of the importance of the features were
kept whether we use a dummified or the initial feature space. So
this threat is minor in comparison of the pitfalls of dummification.
We do not make any further distinctions between the two terms
since we use them without making any transformations.
Since the attack cannot be conducted directly on decision trees,
we decided to learn another classifier first. We chose support vector
machines with a linear kernel since it was faster according to a
preliminary experiment. Scripts as well as data used to compare
predictions can be found on the companion webpage.
4 EVALUATION
4.1 Research questions
We address the following research questions:
RQ1: How effective is our adversarial generator to synthesize ad-
versarial configurations? Effectiveness is measured through the ca-
pability of our evasion attack algorithm to generate configurations
that are misclassified:
• RQ1.1: Can we generate adversarial configurations that are
wrongly classified?
• RQ1.2: Are all generated adversarial configurations valid
w.r.t. constraints in the VM?
• RQ1.3: Is using the evasion algorithm more effective than
generating adversarial configurations with random modifi-
cations?
• RQ1.4: Are attacks effective regardless of the targeted class?
RQ2: What is the impact of adding adversarial configurations
to the training set regarding the performance of the classifier? The
intuition is that adding adversarial configurations to the training
set could improve the performance of the classifier when evaluated
on a test set.
4.2 Evaluation protocol
Our evaluation dataset is composed of 4, 500 randomly sampled
and valid video configurations, that we used in previous work [55].
We selected 500 configurations to train the classifier keeping a sim-
ilar representation of non-acceptable configurations (10%, i.e., ≈ 50
configurations) compared to the whole set. The remaining 4, 000
configurations are used as a test set and also have a similar repre-
sentation regarding acceptable/non-acceptable configurations. This
setting contrast with a common practice of using a high percentage
(i.e., around 66%) of available examples to train the classifier. How-
ever, due to the low number of non-acceptable configurations, such
a setting is impossible. k-fold cross-validation is another common
practice used when few data points are available for training (4, 500
configurations is an arguably low number with respect to the size of
2available on the companion webpage: https://github.com/templep/SPLC_2019
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 3: Examples of generated videos using evasion attack
the variant space) but it is used to validate/select a classifier when
several are created (which is not our case here) and in addition, sep-
arating our 4, 500 configurations into smaller sets is likely to create
a lot of sets without any non-acceptable configurations. None of
these practices seem to be adapted to our case.
The key point is that only about 10% of configurations are non-
acceptable. This is a ratio that we cannot control exactly as it de-
pends from the targeted non-functional property. In order to re-
duce imbalance, several data augmentation techniques exist like
SMOTE [17]. Usually, they create artificial configurations while
maintaining the configurations’ distribution in the feature space.
In our case, we compute the centroid between two configurations
and use it as a new configuration. Thanks to the centroid method,
we can bring perfect balance between the two classes (i.e., 50%
of acceptable configurations and non-acceptable configurations).
Technically, we compute how many configurations are needed to
have perfectly balanced sets (i.e., training and test sets): We se-
lect randomly two non-acceptable configurations and compute the
centroid between them, check that it is a never-seen-before con-
figuration and adds it to the available configurations. The process
is repeated until the number of configurations required is reached.
Once a centroid is added to the set of available configurations, it is
available as a configuration to create the next centroid.
In the remainder, we present the results with both original and
balanced data sets in order to assess whether the impact of class
representation imbalance on adversarial attacks. We configured our
evasion attack generator with the following settings: i) we set the
number of attacks points to generate 4000 configurations for RQ1
and 25 configurations for RQ2 as explained hereafter; ii) considered
step size (t ) values are {10−6; 10−4; 10−2; 1; 102; 104; 106}; iii) the
number of iterations is fixed to 20, 50 or 100. To mitigate random-
ness, we repeat ten times the experiments. All results discussed in
this paper can also be found on our companion webpage3.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 RQ1:Howeffective is our adversarial generator to syn-
thesize adversarial configurations?
To answer this question, we assess the number of wrongly clas-
sified adversarial configurations over 4, 000 generations (and about
7, 000 configurations when the training set is balanced) and compare
them to a random baseline: there is to the best of our knowledge
no comparable evasion attack.
RQ1.1: Can we generate adversarial configurations that
are wrongly classified?
For each run, a newly created adversarial (i.e., after nb_disp is
reached) configuration is added to the set of initial configurations
that can be selected to start an evasion attack. We therefore give a
3https://github.com/templep/SPLC_2019
chance to previous adversarial configurations to continue further
their displacement towards the global optimum of the gradient.
Figure 4 shows box-plots resulting of ten runs for each attack
setting. We also show results when the training set is imbalanced
(i.e., using the previous training set containing 500 configurations
with about 10% of non-acceptable configurations) and when it is
balanced (i.e., increasing the number of non-acceptable configu-
rations using the data augmentation technique described above).
Both Figure 4a and Figure 4b indicate that we can always achieve
100% of misclassified configurations with our attacks. Regarding
Figure 4a, all generated configurations become misclassified when
step size is set to 1.0 or a higher value. When 100 displacements are
allowed (see Figure 4b), the limit appears earlier, i.e., when t equals
0.01. Similar results can be obtained when the number of maximum
displacements is set to 50, the only difference is that with t set to
0.01 not all adversarial configurations are misclassified but about
3, 900 (97.5%) when the training set is imbalanced and about 3, 700
(92.5%) with a balanced set.
Discussion. Increasing the number of displacements require lower
step sizes to reach the misclassification goal but it comes at the cost
of more computations. However, increasing the number of displace-
ments when the step size is already large results in incredibly large
displacements, leading to invalid configurations in the MOTIV case.
RQ1.2: Are all generated adversarial configurations valid
w.r.t. constraints in the VM?
As discussed in Section 3, we perform a basic type check on fea-
tures. However, this check does not cover specific constraints such
as cross-tree ones. To ensure the full compliance of our adversarial
configurations, we run the analysis realised by the MOTIV video
generator. This includes, amongst others, checking the correctness
features values with respect to their specified intervals.
Figure 5 shows on the X-axis the different step sizes while the
Y-axis depicts the number of valid adversarial configurations w.r.t.
constraints. Regardless of the number of displacements andwhether
the training set is balanced, all results are the same except for Fig-
ure 5 that presents one difference for a displacement step size of 100.
One possible explanation is that when the training set is balanced,
more configurations can be taken as a starting point of the evasion
algorithm: the gradient descent procedure might lead the current
attack towards a slightly different area in which configurations
remain valid. Overall, regardless of the number of authorized dis-
placements, we can see a clear drop of valid configurations from
4, 000 to 0 between step size set to 1 and 100.
Discussion: We thus can scope the parameters such that adver-
sarial configurations are both successful and valid: when step size
is set to a value between 0.01 and 1.0, regardless of the number of
displacements. Increasing the step size leads to non-valid configura-
tions while with smaller step sizes, adversarial configurations have
not moved enough to cross the separation of the classifier (leading
to unsuccessful attacks).
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(a) Number of misclassified adversarial configurations (20 displacements) (b) Number of misclassified adversarial configurations (100 displacements)
Figure 4: Number of successful attacks on class acceptable; X-axis represents different step size values t while Y-axis is the
number of misclassified adversarial configurations by the classifier. For each t value, results with balanced and imbalanced
training set are shown (respectively in blue and orange).
Figure 5: Number of valid attacks on class acceptable; X-
axis represents different step size t values; Y-axis reports the
number of valid configurations. In red and blue are respec-
tive results with an imbalance and a balance training set in
terms of classes representation.
RQ1.3: Is using the evasion algorithmmore effective than
generating adversarial configurationswith randomdisplace-
ments? Previous results of RQ1.1 and RQ1.2 show we are able to
craft valid adversarial configurations that can be misclassified by
the ML classifier, but is our algorithm better than a random base-
line? The baseline algorithm consists in: i) for each feature, choosing
randomly whether to modify it; ii) choosing randomly to follow
the slope of the gradient or going against it (the role of ‘-’ of line
5 in Algorithm 1 that can be changed into a ‘+’); iii) choosing ran-
domly a degree of displacement (corresponding to the slope of the
gradient (∇F (xm−1)) of line 5 in Algorithm 1). Both the step size
and the number of displacements are the same as in the previous
experiments.
Figure 6 shows the ability of random attacks to successfully
mislead the classifier. Random modifications are not able to exceed
2, 500misclassifications (regardless of the number of displacements,
the step size or whether the training set is balanced or not) which
corresponds tomore than half the generated configurations butwith
a lower effectiveness than with our evasion attack. The maximum
number of misclassified configurations after random modifications
starts from step size t = 10, 000 regardless of the studied number
of displacements.
Considering the validity of these configurations, results are sim-
ilar to what can be observed in Figure 5. The only difference is that
the transition from 4, 000 to 0 in the number of valid configurations
is smoother and happens when t is in [0.01; 100].
Discussion: Previous results lead us to state that the effectiveness
of evasion attacks are superior to random modifications since i)
evasion attacks are able to craft configurations that are always
misclassified by the ML classifier while less than 2, 500 over 4, 000
generations will be misclassified using random modifications; ii)
generated evasion attacks support a larger set of parameter values
for which generated configurations are valid; iii) we were able to
identify sweet spots for which evasion attacks were able to generate
4, 000 configurations that were both misclassified and valid.
RQ1.4: Are attacks effective regardless of the targeted class?
Previously, we generated evasion attacks from the class non-acceptable
and tried to make them acceptable for the ML classifier but is our
attack symmetric? We thus configure our adversarial configura-
tions generator so that it moves configurations from the class +1
(acceptable configurations) to the class -1 (non-acceptable).
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(a) Number of successful random attacks after 20 displacements (b) Number of successful random attacks after 100 displacements
Figure 6: Number of successful random attacks on class acceptable; X-axis represents different step size values t while Y-axis is
the number ofmisclassified adversarial configurations by the classifier. In red and blue are respective resultswith an imbalance
and a balance training set in terms of classes representation.
(a) Number of successful adversarial attacks after 20 displacements (b) Number of successful adversarial attacks after 100 displacements
Figure 7: Number of successful adversarial attacks on class non-acceptable; X-axis represents different step size values t while
Y-axis is the number of misclassified adversarial configurations by the classifier; In orange and blue are respectively shown
results when the training set is not balanced and when it is.
Overall, the attack is symmetric: all generated adversarial con-
figurations can be misclassified. Figure 7a shows that all generated
configurations are misclassified when step size is set to 1 or higher
with a number of displacements of 20 while, when the number of
displacements is set to 100 (see Figure 7b), the step size can be set
to 0.01 or higher. These observations are the same regardless of the
balance in the training set.
Regarding the adversarial configuration validity, a transition
from 4, 000 to 0 can still be observed. However, when the number
of displacements is set to 20 or when the training set is balanced,
the transition is abrupt and occurs when step size belongs to the
[100, 10, 000] range. With a higher number of displacements (i.e.,
50 and 100 and no balance), the transition is smoother but happens
with smaller step sizes (i.e., with t in between [0.01; 100]. Adversar-
ial configurations can be generated regardless of the targeted class
even if targeting the least represented class seems promising.
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Our generated adversarial attacks are: 100% effective (al-
ways misclassified, RQ1.1), do not depend on the target class
(RQ1.4) and yield valid configurations (RQ1.2). In contrast,
our random baseline was only able to achieve 62.5% of ef-
fectiveness at best (RQ1.3). The balance in the training set
does not affect these results and the targeted class affects
show the same trends despite small differences (RQ1.4).
4.3.2 RQ2: What is the impact of adding adversarial con-
figurations to the training set regarding the performance of
the classifier? In our previous experiments, we only evaluated
the impact of generated attacks in test set. Yet, some ML techniques
(GANs) take advantage of adversarial instances by incorporating
them in the training set to improve the classifier confidence and
possibly performance. In our context, we want to assess the impact
of our attacks when our classifier includes them in the dataset used
during the training phase, especially with less “aggressive” (e.g.,
small step sizes and a low number of displacements) configurations
of the attacks.
To do so, we allowed 20 displacements in order to avoid configu-
rations moving too far from their initial positions and we restrict
the step size to every power of 10 in between 10−4 and 101. For
each step size, we generate 25 adversarial configurations that are
added all at once in the training set, we retrain the classifier and
evaluate it on the configurations that constitute the initial test set
(without any adversarial configurations in it). Every retraining pro-
cess were repeated ten times in order to mitigate the effects of the
random configuration selection and starting configurations. We
also present results when the training set is balanced, in which
case we have also augmented the test set to bring balance and to
follow the same data distribution. In this case, the test set does not
contain 4, 000 configurations but about 7, 000 in which 50% of the
configurations are considered acceptable and the remaining are
considered non-acceptable.
Figure 8 shows the accuracy of the retrained classifiers over a
test set composed of 4, 000 configurations for the red part and 7, 000
configurations for the blue one.
The initial accuracy of the classifier was 96.4562% over the same
4, 000 configurations and is shown as the horizontal red line. We
make the following observations: i) using adversarial configura-
tions in the training, even with low step sizes, tend to decrease the
accuracy of the retrained classifier; ii) starting from step sizes of 1,
every run gives the same result.
Specifically, with step size equals to 10−4, the median of the
boxplot is very close to the initial accuracy (i.e., 96.4562%) of the
classifier and the interquartile range is small suggesting that the
impact of adding adversarial configurations into the training set is
marginal. Between 10−3 to 102, the median is slightly decreasing
and the interquartile range tends to increase. At t = 10−1 the accu-
racy of the classifier drops to 91%, the adversarial configurations are
specially efficient, forcing the ML classifier to change drastically its
separation resulting in a lot of prediction errors. The last two step
sizes shows that all the runs with the same step size give the same
results in terms of accuracy. Focusing on these runs, adversarial
configurations had features with the same value: the amount of
Figure 8: Accuracy of the classifier after retraining with 25
adversarial configurations in the training set over a test set
of 4, 000 configurations (7, 000 configurations when the train-
ing set is balanced). In red are results when no balance are
forced in the classes, in blue, both training set and test set are
balanced. The initial accuracy of the classifier is represented
by the horizontal line (96.4562% for the red line and 96.7143%
for the blue one). X-axis represents different step size val-
ues t while Y-axis is the accuracy of the classifier (zoomed
between 80% and 100%).
heat haze, of blur, of compression artefact or the amount of static
noise of the 25 adversarial configurations are all equal. All of these
features are directly related to the global quality of images, and are
key for the classifier accuracy. We explain the evolution of the clas-
sifier’s accuracy as a combination of the contribution of the 8 most
important features and the constraints of the VM. For low step sizes
(t ∈ [10−4, 10−2]), displacements are modest and therefore pertur-
bations are very limited, though slightly observable. The sweet spot
is at t = 10−1: the resulting displacement is important enough to
move features values enough so that the associated configurations
are moved effectively towards the separation and fool the classi-
fier. We computed the means and standard deviations between the
initial and adversarial configurations and their difference witness
the impact of adversarial configurations on the classifier. For larger
values of t (i.e., > to 10−1), these features lose their impact because
their values are limited by constraints (so that they do not exceed
the bounds).
In the case where training and test sets are balanced (in blue on
Figure 8), results follow the same tendency. Since most of added
configurations to provide balance are well classified, we see that
the accuracy is a bit higher than in the non-balanced. Values remain
close to the baseline, however, when t = 1.0, results are worse than
for other executions as for the non-balanced setting. Yet, we cannot
conclude about the classifier robustness and more experiments
should be conducted to take into account the fact the balanced
and non-balanced datasets do not contain the same number of
configurations.
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Our attacks cannot improve the classifier’s accuracy but can
make it significantly worse: 25 adversarial configuration
over 500 can make the accuracy drop by 5%. Successful
attacks also pinpoint visual features that do influence the
videos’ acceptability and that do make sense from the SPL
perspective (computer vision).
5 THREATS TO VALIDITY
Internal threats.Choice of parameter values for your experiments
may constitute a threat. The step size has been set to 10 different
power of 10, we only used 3 different number of allowed displace-
ments (i.e., 20, 50 and 100). From our perspective, using step sizes
of 10−7 in a highly dimensional space seems ridiculously small
while, on the contrary, using step sizes of 104 are tremendously
large which motivates our choice to not going over these bound-
aries. However, the lower boundary could have been extended
which might have affect results regarding RQ2. Still, given the de-
sign of our attack generator, it is likely that performance of the
classifier would never have increased. Regarding the number of
displacements, we could have used finer grained values. We sought
a compromise between allowing a lot of small steps and a few big
steps. Regarding the choice of evasion attacks, as presented in Sec-
tion 2, several techniques exist. Evasion attacks showed interesting
results and open new perspectives that we discuss in the Section 6.
We rely on centroids to deal with class imbalance (see Section 4.2).
The centroidmethod has pros and cons: centroids are easy and quick
to compute, new configurations tend to follow the same distribu-
tion as they result in more densely populated clusters and on rare
occasions, make clusters expand a little bit. However, new config-
urations may not be realistic, since they do not provide so much
diversity – centroids, by definition, lie in the middle of the cluster
of points. Since our goal is only to limit imbalance in the available
configurations, this technique is appropriate while maintaining the
initial distribution of configurations. However, we are aware that
other data augmentation techniques can be used.
External threats.We only assessed our adversarial attack gen-
erator on one case study, namely MOTIV. Yet, MOTIV is a complex
and industrial case exhibiting various challenges for SPL analysis,
including heterogeneous features, a large variability space and non-
trivial non-functional aspects. The x.264 encoder has been studied
(e.g., [41]) but is relatively small in terms of features (only 16 were
selected), heterogeneity (only Boolean features) and number of con-
figurations. This can nevertheless be a candidate for replicating our
study. Our adversarial approach is not specific to the video domain
and, in principle, applicable to any SPL. Generating adversarial
configurations without taking into account all constraints of the
variability model directly into the attack algorithm may threaten
the applicability of our approach to other SPLs. Calls to SAT/SMT
solvers are unpractical due to feature heterogeneity and the fre-
quency of validity checks. Benchmarks of large and real-world
feature models can be considered if we are only interested in sam-
pling aspects [35, 52]. Finally, open-source configurable systems
like JHipster [32] can be of interest to study non-functional proper-
ties like binaries’ sizes or testing predictions. We also considered
accuracy as a the main performance measure. Accuracy is the stan-
dard measure used in the advML literature [1, 7–9, 28, 42] to assess
the impact of attacks.
6 DISCUSSIONS
Adversarial configurations pinpoint areas of the configuration space
where the ML classifier fails or has low confidence in its prediction.
We qualitatively discuss what the existence of adversarial configu-
rations suggests for an SPL and to what extent the knowledge of
adversarial configurations is actionable for MOTIV developers.
#1 Adversarial training. A first reaction is simply to seek im-
provements of the ML classifier and making it more robust to at-
tacks. Previous work on advML [1, 11, 23, 29, 38] proposed different
defense strategies in presence of adversarial configurations. Adver-
sarial training is a specific category of defense: the training sample
is augmented with adversarial examples to make the ML models
more robust against them. In our case study, it consists in apply-
ing our attack generator and re-inject adversarial configurations
as part of the original training set. We saw in RQ2 that, when ad-
versarial configurations are introduced in the training set, even
moderately agressive attacks affect the ML classifier performance.
Our adversarial training is not adequate: our adversarial generator
has simply not been designed for this defensive task and rather
excels in finding misclassifications. It opens two perspectives. The
first is to apply other, more effective defense mechanisms (mani-
fold projections, stochasticity, prepossessing, etc. [1, 11, 23, 29, 38]).
The second and most important perspective is to leverage adver-
sarial ML knowledge for improving the SPL itself with “friendly”
rather than malicious attacks, fooling the classifier is a mean to this
objective.
#2 Improvement of the testing oracle. The labelling of videos
as acceptable or non-acceptable – the testing oracle – is approxi-
mated by the ML classifier. If the oracle is not precise enough, it is
likely that the approximation performs even worse. In the MOTIV
case, oracles are an approximation of the human perception system
which in turn could be seen as an approximation of the real separa-
tion between acceptable images and non-acceptable ones regarding
a specific task. Object recognition should potentially work on an
infinite number of input images which makes the construction of
a “traditional” oracle (a function that is able to give the nature of
every single input) challenging. Testing oracles for an SPL are pro-
grams that may fail on some specific configurations. Adversarial
configurations can lead to “cases” (videos) for which the oracle
has not been designed and tested for and may provide insights to
improve such oracles.
MOTIV’s developers may revise the visual assessment procedure
to determine what a video of sufficient quality means [24, 55]. Ad-
versarial configurations can help understanding the bugs (if any) of
the procedure over specific videos (see Figure 3, page 5). Based on
this knowledge, a first option is to fix this procedure – adversarial
configurations would then act as good test cases for ensuring non-
regression issues with the oracle. In our context, one can envision to
crowd-source the labelling effort with humans (e.g., with Amazon
Mechanical Turk [16]). However, asking human beings to check
whether a video is acceptable or not is costly and hardly scalable –
we have derived more than 4, 000 videos. Crowd-sourcing is also
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prone to errors made by humans due to fatigue or disagreements
on the task. To decrease the effort, adversarial configurations can
be specifically reviewed as part of the labelling process. An open
problem is to find a way to control adversarial displacements such
that we are able to ensure that the generated adversarial config-
uration does not cross the ML separation. This level of control is
left for future work. Overall, the choice of the adequate testing
oracle strategy in the MOTIV case is beyond the scope of this paper.
Several factors are involved, including cost (e.g., manually labelling
videos has a significant cost) and reliability.
#3 Improvement of the variability model.While generating
adversarial configurations, SPL practitioners can gain insights on
whether the feature model is under or over constrained. Looking at
modified features of adversarial configurations (see RQ2), practition-
ers can observe that the same patterns arise involving some features
or combinations of features. Such behavior typically indicate that
constraints are missing – some configurations are allowed despite
they should not be but it was never specifically defined as such in
the variability model. Conversely, adversarial configurations can
also help identifying which constraints can be relaxed.
#4 Improvement of the variability implementation. Fea-
tures of MOTIV are implemented in Lua [33]. An incorrect imple-
mentation can be the cause of non-acceptable configurations either
because of bugs in individual features or undesired feature inter-
actions. In the case of MOTIV, we did not find variability-related
bugs. We rather considered that the cause of non-acceptable videos
was due to the variability model and that the solution was to add
constraints preventing this.
7 RELATEDWORK
Our contribution is at the crossroad of (adversarial) ML, constraint
mining, variability modeling, and testing.
Testing and learning SPLs. Testing all configurations of an
SPL is most of time challenging and sometimes impossible, due to
the exponential number of configurations [31, 37, 39, 58–60]. ML
techniques have been developed to reduce cost, time and energy
of deriving and testing new configurations using inference mech-
anisms. For instance, regression models can be used to perform
performance prediction of configurations that have not been gen-
erated yet [30, 43, 47, 50, 51, 57] . In [54, 55], we proposed to use
supervised ML to discover and retrieve constraints that were not
originally expressed before in a variability model. We used decision
trees to create a boundary between the configurations that should
be discarded and the ones that are allowed. In this paper, we build
upon previous works and follow a new research direction with
SVM-based adversarial learning.
Siegmund et al. [52] reviewed ML approaches on variability mod-
els. They propose THOR, a tool for synthesizing realistic attributed
variability models. An important issue in this line of research is to
assess the robustness of ML on variability models. Yet, our work
specifically aims to improve ML classifiers of SPL. None of these
bodies of work use adversarial ML neither the possible impact that
adversarial configurations could have on the predictions.
Adversarial ML can be seen as set of security assesement and
reinforcement techniques helping to better understand flaws and
weaknesses of ML algorithms. Typical scenarios in which adversar-
ial learning is used are: network traffic monitoring, spam filtering,
malware detection [1, 6–10] and more recently autonomous cars
and object recognition [25, 26, 36, 44, 45, 49, 61]. In such works,
authors suppose that a system uses ML in order to perform a clas-
sification task (e.g., differentiate emails as spams and non-spams)
and some malicious people try to fool such classification system.
These attackers can have knowledge on the system such as the
dataset used, the kind of ML technique that is used, the description
of data, etc. The attack then consists in crafting a data point in the
description space that the ML algorithm will misclassify. Recent
works [28] used adversarial techniques to strengthen the classifier
by specifically creating data that would induce such kind of misclas-
sification. In this paper, we propose to use a similar approach but
adapted to SPL engineering: adversarial techniques may be used to
strengthen the SPL (including variability model, implementation
and testing oracle over products) while analyzing a small set of
configurations. To our knowledge, no adversarial technique has
been experimented in this context.
8 CONCLUSION
Machine learning techniques are increasingly used in software
product line engineering as they are able to predict whether a
configuration (and its associated program variant) meets quality
requirements. ML techniques can make prediction errors in areas
where the confidence in the classification is low. We adapted adver-
sarial techniques on our MOTIV case and generated both successful
and valid attacks that can fool a classifier with a low number of
adversarial configurations and decrease its performance by 5%. The
analysis of the attacks exhibit the influence of important features
and variability model constraints. This is a first and promising step
in the direction of using adversarial techniques as a novel frame-
work for quality assurance of software product lines. As future
work, we plan to compare adversarial learning with traditional
learning or sampling techniques (e.g., random, t-wise). Generally
we want to use adversarial ML to support quality assurance of SPLs.
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